The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equilibria of multi-player strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a fixed dependency graph for pay-off functions. A logical system describing properties of functional dependence for any given graph is proposed and is proven to be complete.
Introduction
Functional Dependence. In this paper we study dependency between players' strategies in Nash equilibria. For example, the coordination game described by Table 1 has two Nash equilibria: (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ). Knowing the strategy of player a in a Nash equilibrium of this game, one can predict the strategy of player b. We say that player a functionally determines player b and denote this by a b. Note that in the case of the coordination game, we also have b a. However, for the game described by Table 2 statement a b is true, but b a is false.
The main focus of this paper is functional dependence in multiplayer games. For example, consider a "parity" game with three players a, b, c. Each of the players picks 0 or 1, and all players are rewarded if the sum of all three numbers is even. This game has four different Nash equilibria: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1) , and (1, 1, 0). It is easy to see that knowledge of any two players' strategies in a Nash equilibrium reveals the third. Thus, using our notation, for example a, b c. At the same time, ¬(a c). As another example, consider a game between three players in which each player picks 0 or 1 and all players are rewarded if they have chosen the same strategy. This game has only two Nash equilibria: (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1) . Thus, knowledge of the strategy of player a in a Nash equilibrium reveals the strategies of the two other players. We write this as a b, c.
Functional dependence as a relation has been studied previously, especially in the context of database theory. Armstrong [1] presented the following sound and complete axiomatization of this relation: The above axioms are known in database literature as Armstrong's axioms [5] . Beeri, Fagin, and Howard [2] suggested a variation of Armstrong's axioms that describe properties of multi-valued dependence.
Dependency Graphs. As a side result, we will show that the logical system formed by the Armstrong axioms is sound and complete with respect to the strategic game semantics. Our main result, however, is a sound and complete axiomatic system for the relation in games with a given dependency graph.
Dependency graphs [6, 7, 4, 3] put restrictions on the pay-off functions that can be used in the game. For example, dependency graph Γ 1 depicted in Figure 1 , specifies that the pay-off function of player a only can depend on the strategy of player b in addition to the strategy of player a himself. The pay-off function for player b can only depend on the strategies of players a and c in addition to the strategy of player b himself, etc. Note that although the statement a, b c, d is true for the game described above, it is not true for many other games with the same dependency graph Γ 1 . In this paper we study properties of functional dependence that are common to all games with the same dependency graph. An example of such statement for the graph Γ 1 , as we will show in Proposition 1, is a d → b, c d.
Informally, this property is true for any game over graph Γ 1 because any dependencies between players a and d must be established through players b and c. This intuitive approach, however, does not always lead to the right conclusion. For example, in graph Γ 2 depicted in Figure 2 , players b and c also separate players a and d. Thus, according to the same intuition, the statement a d → b, c d must also be true for any game over graph Γ 2 . This, however, is not true. Consider, for example, a game in which all four players have three strategies: rock, paper, and scissors. As our final example, consider the graph Γ 3 depicted in Figure 3 . We will show that a c → b c is not true for at least one game over graph Γ 3 . Indeed, consider the game in which players a, b, and c use real numbers as possible strategies. Players a and c have a constant payoff of 0. The pay-off of the player b is equal to 0 if players a and c choose the same real number. Otherwise, it is equal to the number chosen by the player b himself. Note that in any Nash equilibrium of this game, the strategies of players a and c are equal. Therefore, a c, but ¬(b c). The main result of this paper is a sound and complete axiomatization of all properties of functional dependence for any given dependency graph. This result is closely related to work by More and Naumov on functional dependence of secrets over hypergraphs [8] . However, the logical system presented in this paper is significantly different from theirs. A similar relation of "rational" functional dependence without any connection to dependency graphs has been axiomatized by Naumov and Nicholls [9] .
The counterexample that we have constructed for the game in Figure 3 significantly relies on the fact that player b has infinitely many strategies. However, in this paper we show completeness with respect to the semantics of finite games, making the result stronger.
Syntax and Semantics
The graphs that we consider in this paper contain no loops, multiple edges, or directed edges.
Definition 1 For any set of vertices
A cut (U, W ) of a graph (V, E) is a partition U W of the set V . For any vertex v in a graph, by Adj(v) we mean the set of all vertices adjacent to v. By Adj + (v) we mean the set Adj(v) ∪ {v}.
Definition 2 For any graph Γ = (V, E), by Φ(Γ) we mean the minimal set of formulas such that
Definition 3 By game over graph Γ = (V, E) we mean any strategic game
The finite set of players in the game is the set of vertices V , (ii) The finite set of strategies S v of any player v is an arbitrary set, (iii) The pay-off function u v of any player v only depends on the strategies of the players in Adj
By N E(G) we denote the set of all Nash equilibria in the game G. The next definition is the core definition of this paper. The second item in the list below gives a precise meaning of the functional dependence predicate A B.
Definition 4 For any game G over graph Γ and any φ ∈ Φ(Γ), we define binary relation G φ as follows
, where here and everywhere below s v v∈V = X t v v∈V means that s x = t x for each x ∈ X.
Axioms
The following is the set of axioms of our logical system. It consists of the original Armstrong axioms and an additional Contiguity axiom that captures properties of functional dependence specific to a given graph Γ. Note that the Contiguity axiom, unlike the Gateway axiom [8] , effectively requires "double layer" divider B(U ), B(W ) between sets A and C. This is because in our setting values are assigned to the vertices and not to the edges of the graph. We write Γ φ if φ ∈ Φ(Γ) is provable from the combination of the axioms above and propositional tautologies in the language Φ(Γ) using the Modus Ponens inference rule. We write X Γ φ if φ is provable using the additional set of axioms X. We often omit the parameter Γ when its value is clear from the context.
Examples
In this section we give examples of proofs in our formal system. The soundness and the completeness of this system will be shown in the next two sections. Proof. Consider cut (U, W ) of the graph Γ 1 such that U = {a, b} and W = {c, d}. Thus, B(U ) = {b} and B(W ) = {c}. Therefore, by the Contiguity axiom, 
by the first assumption. Similarly, using the second assumption, b, c a. Hence, by the Augmentation axiom, b, c a, b, c.
Thus, from statement (1) Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 are special cases of a more general principle. We will say that a subset of vertices is sparse if the shortest path between any two vertices in this subset contains at least three edges. The general principle states that if W is a sparse subset of vertices in the graph (V, E) and each vertex w ∈ W is functionally determined by the set V \ {w}, then the subset V \ W functionally determines the subset W :
For example, the set {a, d} in the graph Γ 1 depicted in Figure 1 
Soundness
We prove soundness of our logical system by proving soundness of each of our four axioms separately.
Lemma 1 (reflexivity) G A B for each game G over a graph Γ = (V, E) and each B ⊆ A ⊆ V .
Proof. For any s, t ∈ N E(G), if s = A t, then s = B t because A ⊆ B. G A B, then G A, C B, C for each game G over a graph Γ = (V, E) and each A, B, C ⊆ V .
Lemma 2 (augmentation) If

Proof. Suppose that G
A B and consider any s, t ∈ N E(G) such that s = A,C t. We will show that s = B,C t. Indeed, s = A,C t implies that s = A t and s = C t. Thus, s = B t by the assumption G A B. Therefore, s = B,C t. Proof. Suppose that G A, B C. Consider any s = s v v∈V ∈ N E(G) and t = t v v∈V ∈ N E(G) such that s = B(U ),B(W ),B t. We will prove that s = C t. Indeed, consider strategy profile e = e v v∈V such that
Lemma 3 (transitivity)
We will first prove that e ∈ N E(G). Assuming the opposite, let v ∈ V be a player in the game G that can increase his pay-off by changing strategy in profile e. Without loss of generality, let v ∈ U . Then, e = Adj(v)∪{v} s. Thus, player v can also increase his pay-off by changing strategy in profile s, which is a contradiction with the choice of s ∈ N E(G).
Note that e = U,B s and e = W,B t. Thus, e = A,B s and e = C s. Hence, e = C s by the assumption G A, B C. Therefore, s = C e = C t.
Completeness
Lemma 5 B(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ B(X) ∪ B(Y ).
Proof. Let v ∈ B(X ∪ Y ). Thus, v ∈ X ∪ Y and there is w / ∈ X ∪ Y such that (v, w) ∈ E. Without loss of generality, assume that v ∈ X. Hence, v ∈ X and w / ∈ X. Therefore, v ∈ B(X).
Lemma 6 A C → A, B C.
Proof. Assume A C. By the Reflexivity axiom, A, B A. Thus, by the Transitivity axiom, A, B C.
Lemma 7 A B, C → A B.
Proof. Assume A B, C. By the Reflexivity axiom, B, C B. Thus, by the Transitivity axiom, A B.
Theorem 1 For any graph Γ = (V, E) and any formula φ ∈ Φ(V ), if Γ φ, then there must exist a game (V,
Proof. Suppose that Γ φ. Let M be any maximal consistent subset of formulas in Φ(Γ) such that ¬φ ∈ M .
Definition 5 For any set of vertices A, let A * be the set {v ∈ V | M A v}.
Proof. Let a ∈ A. By the Reflexivity axiom, A a. Hence, a ∈ A * .
Proof. Let A * = {a 1 , . . . , a n }. By the definition of A * , M A a i , for any i ≤ n. We will prove, by induction on k, that M (A a 1 , . . . , a k ) for any 0 ≤ k ≤ n. Base Case: M A ∅ by the Reflexivity axiom. Induction Step: Assume that M (A a 1 , . . . , a k ). By the Augmentation axiom, M A, a k+1 a 1 , . . . , a k , a k+1 .
Recall that M A a k+1 . Again by the Augmentation axiom, M (A A, a k+1 ). Hence, M (A a 1 , . . . , a k , a k+1 ), by (3) and the Transitivity axiom.
For any set of vertices A, we will now define strategic game
over graph Γ. For the purposes of this definition only, we assume that a direction is assigned to each edge of the graph Γ in an arbitrary way.
Any player v ∈ A * may either choose strategy pass or opt to play "pennies" with all of his adjacent players. In the latter case, he decides on either heads or tails for each adjacent player. The player cannot choose to pass with one player and to play pennies with others. Formally, if v ∈ A * , then
Similarly, any player v / ∈ A * may either choose between strategies 0 and 1 or decide to play pennies with all of his adjacent players. Thus, if v / ∈ A * , then
Furthermore, it will be assumed that any isolated (one that has no adjacent vertices) vertex of the graph is prohibited from playing the pennies game. Thus such vertices either have a single strategy pass or a set of just two strategies: 0 and 1. We define the pay-off function of any player v as the sum of rewards in individual pennies mini-games on the edges adjacent to v or a possible penalty imposed on v for not playing the pennies. Penalty. If there are u, w ∈ Adj + (v) \ A * such that u plays strategy 0 and w plays strategy 1, then a penalty in the amount of 1 is imposed on v unless v plays pennies. For example, consider the strategy profile depicted in Figure 6 . We will assume that elements of A * are the shaded vertices. Vertices w, x, and y are subject to the penalty because player x plays 0 and player y plays 1. Players u and v have chosen to play pennies, and thus are not subject to any penalties. Rewards. In an individual mini-game along any edge of the graph Γ, rewards are only given if both players are playing pennies. The rewards are given according to the rules of a variation of the standard Matching Pennies game: the player who is, say, at the beginning of the directed edge is rewarded 1 for matching his opponent's strategy and the player at the opposite end of the edge is rewarded 1 for not matching his opponent's strategy.
For example, in the strategy profile depicted in Figure 6 , player u gets the reward 1 for matching player v. Player v is not rewarded. Players x, y, and w also do not receive any rewards since they are not playing pennies.
This concludes the definition of the game G A .
Lemma 9
In any Nash equilibrium of the game G A , no player is playing the pennies game.
Proof. Assume that a vertex v is playing pennies games in a strategy profile s. Due to the definition of the set of strategies in the game G A , vertex v can not be an isolated vertex in the graph Γ. Let u be any vertex adjacent to v. If player u is not playing pennies in s, then he can increase his pay-off by playing pennies. If player u is playing pennies in s, then either player u or player v would want to switch his strategy in the mini-game along edge (u, v) since the two-player Matching Pennies game has no Nash equilibria. Therefore, strategy profile s is not a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 10 s w1 = s w2 for each w 1 , w 2 ∈ Adj + (v) \ A * , each v ∈ V , and each s = s w w∈V ∈ N E(G A ).
Proof. By Lemma 9, no player is playing pennies in profile s. Suppose that s w1 = s w2 for some w 1 , w 2 ∈ Adj + (v) \ A * . Thus, player v is subject to penalty in the strategy profile s. Then, he can increase his pay-off by starting to play pennies and avoiding the penalty. Therefore, s / ∈ N E(G A ).
Definition 6 For any u, v ∈ V , let u ∼ v if there is a path from u to v in graph Γ such that no two consecutive vertices of the path belong to the set A * .
Lemma 11 Relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on the set V .
By [v] we will denote the equivalence class of vertex v with respect to this relation.
Proof. Let π = (w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w k ) be a path connecting vertices u and v (w 0 = u and w k = v) such that no two consecutive vertices in π belong to A * . We prove the statement by induction on k. Proof. Let w ∈ B([v]), but w / ∈ A * . By Definition 1, there is u / ∈ [v] such that (w, u) ∈ E. Consider the two-vertex path π = (w, u). Since w / ∈ A * , no two consecutive vertices in π belong to A * . Hence, w ∼ u. Note that v ∼ w by Definition 1. Thus, v ∼ u, which is a contradiction.
* , then player d has only two options in the game G A : to play pennies or to decide to pass. By Lemma 9, player d chooses the strategy pass under strategy profiles s and s . Therefore, s d = s d . We will now assume that d / ∈ A * . If d ∼ c 0 for some c 0 ∈ C \ A * , then, by Lemma 12, s d = s c0 = s c0 = s d . We will now assume that d c for each c ∈ C \ A * . Thus,
. By the Contiguity axiom,
Due to the assumption M C D and Lemma 6 and Lemma 7,
Then, by Lemma 13, M A * d. Thus, by Lemma 8 and the Transitivity axiom, M A d. Therefore, d ∈ A * , which is a contradiction.
Definition 7
For any A ⊆ V and any k ∈ {0, 1}, let strategy profile s k,A be defined as
Proof. By the definition of the game G A , no player is paying a penalty in the strategy profile s k,A . At the same time, no player can get a reward by unilaterally switching to playing pennies.
Lemma 16 If
The product construction below defines a way to combine several games played over the same graph into a single game. The pay-off for a given player in the combined game is the sum of his pay-offs in the individual games.
for i ∈ I be any family of games over the same graph Γ = (V, E).
Lemma 19 If {G i } i∈I is a family of games over a graph Γ such that each of these games has a nonempty set of Nash equilibria, then i∈I G
We will show that s i0 = D t i0 . By the assumption of the lemma, for each i ∈ I, the game G i has at least one Nash equilibria. We denote an arbitrary one of them by e i = e i v v∈V . Consider strategy profiles S = s i v i∈I v∈V and T = t i v i∈I v∈V for the game i∈I G i such that
By Lemma 18, we have S, T ∈ N E( i∈I G i ). Note that S = C T due to the assumption s i0 = C t i0 . Hence, S = D T by the assumption of the lemma. Therefore, s i0 = D t i0 . (⇐) : Consider Nash equilibria S = s i v i∈I v∈V and T = t i v i∈I v∈V of the game i∈I G i such that S = C T. We will show that S = D T. It will be sufficient to show that s Proof. Induction on the structural complexity of formula ψ. The case ψ ≡ ⊥ follows from the assumption of consistency of the set M and Definition 4. The case ψ ≡ ψ 1 → ψ 2 follows from maximality and consistency of the set M and Definition 4 in the standard way. Assume now that ψ ≡ E F .
If E F ∈ M , then, by Lemma 14, G A E F for each A ⊆ V . By Lemma 15, each of the games G A has at least one Nash equilibria: s 0,A . Therefore, A⊆V G A E F by Lemma 19.
If A⊆V G A E F , then by Lemma 19, G E E F . Hence, by Definition 4, G E E f for each f ∈ F . Hence, by Lemma 16, f ∈ E * for each f ∈ F . Thus, F ⊆ E * . Note that M E E * by Lemma 8. Hence, M E F by Lemma 7. Therefore, E F ∈ M due to maximality of M .
To finish the proof of the theorem, recall that ¬φ ∈ M . Thus, φ / ∈ M due to consistency of M . Therefore, by Lemma 20, A⊆V G A φ.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have described a sound and complete logical system for functional dependence in strategic games over a fixed dependency graph. The dependency graph puts restrictions on the type of pay-off functions that can be used in the game. If no such restrictions are imposed, then the logical system for functional dependence in strategic games is just the set of original Armstrong axioms. This statement follows from our results since the absence of restrictions corresponds to the case of a complete (in the graph theory sense) dependency graph. In the case of a complete graph, the Contiguity axiom follows from the Armstrong axioms because for any cut (U, W ), the set B(U ) ∪ B(W ) is the set of all vertices in the graph.
